The "Civilian JTF" Phenomenon

Also published in Daily Trust

I must admit that even during the worst period of Boko Haram terror attacks in northern Nigeria, when virtually everybody was in constant fear for his life to the extent where legislators reportedly dodged deliberating on the issue, judges cleverly shied away from handling cases involving suspected Boko Haram insurgents and people never dared to discuss them in their hangouts, I never knew that the insurgents had actually captured some Nigerian territories; large territories for that matter.

I only came to realize that after the commencement of the ongoing intensified military operations against them, when the press began to use terms like “reclaiming” and “liberating” of some villages, town and territories from Boko Haram insurgents by the federal troops. For instance, not long ago, the press quoted an unnamed reliable source boasting that, the Special Forces had reclaimed 25 out of 27 local government areas controlled by Boko Haram in Borno state. The source was also quoted to have identified Magumeri and Goza local governments particularly the hilly areas as the areas where the “final battle” was focused.

Having suffered such huge losses ever since then, it’s clear that Boko Haram’s combat capacity has been significantly weakened, thanks to the improved community cooperation that gave rise to the emergence of civilian vigilante groups popularly known as ‘civilian JTF”, who have been very instrumental in hunting down the insurgents in some of the most affected areas in the north east.

The ensuing public excitement is quite understandable in view of the fragility of security situation in the sub-region since the escalation of the crisis. Likewise, though quite overdue, the current intensified military operations, which came after government decided to take the bull by the horns, have earned it a great deal of credit and substantially restored public confidence in its resolve to deal with the crisis appropriately.

Nevertheless, given the nature, level of indoctrination and modus operandi of Boko Haram insurgents, government should sustain the current momentum and indeed re-intensify the pressure on them with a view to completely crushing them, of course without prejudice to other measures e.g. dialogue offer or any other initiative likely to end the crisis militarily or resolve it peacefully, as the case may be.

After all, being deeply indoctrinated into believing that they are fighting for a just cause and in Allah’s cause for that matter, it isn’t easy, if at all possible, to compel the insurgents to renounce violence by force alone, as it isn’t realistic either to convince them to renounce their beliefs by peaceful means alone.

Incidentally, this obviously emphasizes the need for more efforts by Islamic clerics to focus on addressing the particular religious misconceptions on the bases of which the insurgents were indoctrinated, because as long as they believe in the “religious justifiability” of their mission and actions, it’s virtually impossible to convince them to renounce it without overwhelmingly convincing counter arguments that will clarify and dispel their misconceptions; a task that can only be done by reputable Muslim clerics of course.  

In any case, though I have always supported the idea of using appropriate force to tackle Boko Haram insurgents regardless of whether they agree to engage in dialogue or not, the dramatic success achieved by the “civilian JTF” volunteers and their ability to influence the course of the war underlines the need for further public engagement to help fish out the remnants of the insurgents, their sympathizers and even apologists for that matter, for they are obviously potential terror recruits.

This is imperative in view of the apparent failure of Kabiru Turaki-led Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North to bring the real Boko Haram leadership to the negotiating table within the 90-day period initially given to it, while it isn’t likely to deliver within the 60-day extension recently granted to it either.

After all, barely hours after the extension period was announced, some bomb blasts, which bore the hallmarks of Boko Haram, went off in Sabon Gari area in Kano metropolis killing many people and injuring many more others. That also happened barely a week after the insurgents ambushed and killed tens of people in what appeared to be reprisal attacks against some elements of the “civilian JTF” in two separate incidents in Kaga and Kukawa local government areas of Borno State.

Therefore in as much as it’s necessary to maintain and indeed encourage further public engagement in this struggle, it’s equally necessary to organize it in such a way that the security of the civilian elements engaged in assisting the security operatives is fully safeguarded. This essentially entails limiting the scope of what is expected from such civilian volunteers to intelligence gathering on the insurgents and passing it on to the security operatives to take appropriate actions accordingly.

Furthermore, the security operatives should always provide relevant professional advice to the volunteers and of course appropriate incentives to motivate them and enable them conduct their volunteer work with the required amount of interest and dedication. In the meantime also, utmost care must be taken to prevent infiltrating the ranks of the volunteers by some elements of the insurgents, who, as I reliably understand, already maintain an active intelligence unit of a sort that gathers intelligence and conducts other covert activities that facilitate their deadly operations against the security operatives and the civilians alike.