Nigeria-UAE airport slot row

(Link on Daily Trust)

Just as regular passenger flights between Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began to gradually pick up following several months of disruption over a row on Covid-19 travel protocol, yet another row broke out over airport slots between Air Peace, a Nigerian-registered airline, and the UAE’s Emirates. 

The Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) between Nigeria and the UAE allows international airlines from both countries to request and obtain airport slots in each other’s international airports. 

However, in the absence of a strong Nigerian competitor, the UAE’s Emirates has for years dominated the lucrative Lagos-Dubai and Abuja-Dubai routes. In addition to UAE-bound passengers, many travellers from Nigeria opt for Emirates to get to their respective destinations across the world via Dubai. 

Emirates maintains two Dubai-Lagos and one Dubai-Abuja flights daily making it 21 flights per week. Also, the Abu-Dhabi-based airline, Etihad equally dominates the Nigeria-Abu-Dhabi route, which further consolidates UAE airlines’ virtual monopoly on the Nigeria-UAE route.  

It was only in 2019 that a Nigerian-registered airline, Air Peace commenced passenger flights to UAE’s Sharjah Airport instead of neighbouring Dubai Airport apparently to save a fortune on airport charges, which are obviously higher in the latter. 

The airline recently requested two additional slots to make it three per week, which the UAE denied. Nigeria retaliated by reducing Emirates slots in Nigeria to only 1 per week. Enraged, Emirates suspended its operations in Nigeria and, of course, Air Peace operations in UAE, which triggered a row that almost affected diplomatic relations between the two countries less than two weeks after President Buhari’s state visit to the emirate. 

Though UAE’s recent allocation of seven slots in Dubai Airport to Air Peace suggests an imminent resolution of the row, the incident highlights the struggle over flight frequency among airlines, which sometimes affect diplomatic relations. 

The UAE has had a similar row with other countries including the United States, Canada and some major European countries whose airlines have accused Emirates of practices inconsistent with free-market values to outcompete them on many lucrative international routes in the US, Europe, Canada and elsewhere. 

They have, for instance, alleged that Emirates enjoys subsidy under the table from the deep-pocketed Dubai government, which has enabled it to offer customers unmatched quality services at unmatched rates at the expense of its competitors. However, Emirates has always denied the charges arguing that its operations are guided by standard free-market practices.

Whatever the case is, Emirates has been able to grow from an airline with only two planes leased from Pakistan in 1985 into arguably the world’s largest international airline with more than 260 planes covering more than 150 international destinations. Equally, its base, the Dubai Airport has grown from a literally glorified airstrip in the desert into currently the world’s busiest international airport handling about 800 flights per day at its peak.  

After all, though airlines compete on quality and efficiency in their struggle to outcompete one another in the increasingly thriving hence equally increasingly competitive airline business, they also engage in under-the-table arrangements and other forms of discreet manipulation to disadvantage one another. Besides, notwithstanding relevant international legal and regulatory provisions, governments the world over favour their respective locally-registered airlines against their foreign competitors. 

Anyway, from the celebratory tone of the Nigerian media and the general public following UAE’s allocation of seven slots to Air Peace, more than the three it had requested, it’s obvious that the underlying aim behind UAE’s action is comprehended only by a few, if at all. That explains why Nigeria’s media coverage of the development simplistically suggests that the UAE has conceded and that Air Peace and Nigeria have prevailed. 

Whereas, it’s probably a trick aimed at frustrating Air Peace out of the Nigeria-UAE route all together eventually. It’s what the Hausa describe as “kora da hali” Because restricting the slots to Dubai Airport only exposes Air Peace to direct and unavoidable competition with Emirates, which the former, of course, may not survive in the long run. Air Peace may not afford sustained operation in Dubai Airport due to high airport charges, which are the reasons why it wants to remain in Sharjah Airport in the first place. 

Faced with this, competing with Emirates in ticket pricing would pose a big challenge to Air Peace considering the disproportionately huge disparity in service quality, efficiency and sophistication between the two airlines. 

Besides, Air Peace cannot maintain seven flights to Dubai per week in the first place. Even if its request for two additional Lagos-Sharjah flights to make it three per week were granted, it may not be able to sustain them after the current seasonal travel peak when the UAE receives the highest number of visitors from all over the world each year.  

Now, it remains to be seen whether or not the Air Peace management and the Nigerian government realise the trick and its implications, and indeed how they would react. 

Saudi palace politics

(Link on Daily Trust)

Mohammad bin Salman, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia

The circumstances surrounding the rise of Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) as the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia have brought the dynamics of the palace power struggle in the monarchy to the fore. 

The Saudi ruling dynasty Al-Saud is currently the most powerful ruling dynasty in the world considering the sheer religious, economic and geopolitical significance of the domain it rules over without being subject to any authority. 

The dynasty founded the kingdom. It had, at two separate points in history, founded two emirates in its native Najd region. The first was in 1774 when Mohammad bin Saud and an Islamic scholar-revivalist Sheikh Mohammad bin AbdulWahhab co-founded the Emirate of Diriyah, which lasted until 1818. 

The second was in 1824 when a grandson of bin Saud, Turki bin Abdullah restored the Al Saud reign and founded the Emirate of Najd, which, however, also collapsed in 1891. Yet, 11 years later, Abdul-Aziz bin Abdurrahman Al Saud managed to reclaim it and kept expanding it until he founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. 

Interestingly, the ibn Saud-ibn AbdulWahhab alliance has grown into a kind of intergenerational kinship between their descendants i.e. Al Saud and Al Ash-Sheikh. The former has kept the kingship while the latter has kept the symbolic scholarly authority in the kingdom. Al Saud means the descendants of ibn Saud while Al Ash-Sheikh means the descendants of ibn AbdulWahhab. The current Grand Mufti of the Kingdom, Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Abdullah Al Ash-Sheikh is a lineal descendent of ibn AbdulWahhab. 

Anyway, over the course of Abdul-Aziz’s struggle before and after he founded the kingdom, he kept marrying daughters of Arab tribal chiefs and influential tribal figures to secure the unwavering loyalty of the unpredictable Arab tribes without which he couldn’t have achieved his mission. He was said to have married more than 20 women, of course, maintaining not more than four at once; and had more than 60 children.  

As is the case with all ruling dynasties, wings and individuals among King Abdul-Aziz’s lineage have always been locked in the palace power struggle over positions of influence including kingship. Wings within the dynasty have always developed based on shared maternal backgrounds among his children whose mothers came from different Arab tribes. A wing’s influence is primarily determined by the amount of their mother’s tribal, clannish or familial influence. 

The most influential wing is the Sudairi wing generally and the Sudairi Seven particularly. Their mother, Hassa bint Ahmad As-Sudairi was widely believed to be King Abdul-Aziz’s favoured wife. Her children were equally the most influential particularly the Sudairi Seven who formed a clique of extremely rich princes with networks of highly influential connections within and outside the kingdom. They were Fahd, Sultan, Abdurrahman, Naif, Turki-ath-Thani, Ahmad, and Salman, the current king. Also, their families have over the decades collectively maintained that influence dominating the other wings. 

However, things began to change following the death of King Fahd and the ascension of the then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz to the throne in 2005. Abdullah wasn’t a Sudairi; he was the only male child of his mother; he was, however, very influential within the country’s elite National Guard force, which was responsible for protecting the ruling dynasty. His appointment as the Crown Prince despite his relative disadvantage was seen as a tactical move by King Fahd to preserve the intactness of the Guard’s loyalty and Abdullah’s knowing that, barring any unforeseen circumstances, his turn would come in due course. 

No sooner had Abdullah settled on the throne than he embarked on subtle but obvious moves to promote his own family at the expense of the Sudairis. He appointed some of his children to some very important positions, and though he reluctantly appointed a Sudairi, Sultan as the Crown Prince, he relieved a number of them from important positions.  

He also created a whole new position, the Deputy Crown Prince, to which he appointed Muqrin bin Abdul-Aziz who was supposed to become the Crown Prince once the latter’s position became vacant for whatever reason. Like Abdullah, Muqrin was the only son of his Yemeni mother hence equally considered relatively less advantaged. It was alleged that the plan was to somehow get Abdullah’s son, Mut’ib appointed the Deputy Crown Prince once King Abdullah passed away and Salman became King while Muqrin became the Crown Prince. That way Abdullah’s wing would be in a position to compete favourably with other wings for kingship eventually. Consequently, the Sudairis influence diminished considerably during Abdullah’s reign. 

However, things never went as the Abdullah wing had planned because no sooner had Salman become King following Abdullah’s death than he equally relieved many of those Abdullah had appointed to various important positions including his sons. He also relieved Muqrin of the Deputy Crown Prince, appointed his nephew Mohammad bin Naif and his son Mohammad bin Salman the Crown Prince and the Deputy Crown Prince respectively. Likewise, other Sudairis were appointed or reappointed to various top positions in the kingdom.  

Moreover, two years later he abolished the position of the Deputy Crown Prince, relieved Mohammad bin Naif of the Crown Prince and elevated his son Mohammad bin Salam to the Crown Prince who has since then acted as the de facto King. 

Since then the power struggle has been within the Sudairi wing exclusively especially between the Salman sub-wing, the Sultan sub-wing, and the Naif sub-wing from where the deposed Crown Prince Mohammad bin Naif comes. Many including some highly influential Sudairis have been relieved of their positions. Those who are rightly or wrongly perceived to be harbouring resentment against MBS are being persecuted; many have been imprisoned including bin Naif himself while others have fled the country.