Politics of Amnesty

Also published in Daily Trust 

                               President Jonathan and Sultan of Sokoto

 

The recent controversy generated by the Sultan’s call on President Jonathan to grant amnesty to Boko Haram members, and Mr. President’s subsequent refusal has further highlighted the absence of a common ground to work towards find a lasting solution to this increasingly overwhelming security crisis. Unfortunately also, most of the arguments and counter arguments given by most of the commentators on this issue are devoid of objectivity hence the obvious reflection of their ethno-religious and regional inclinations on their respective commentaries.

On one hand for instance, those who oppose the amnesty look at the issue primarily from the narrow perspective of the inherent geopolitical rivalry between the north and the south, which makes many of them suspect that the whole Boko Haram crisis is a deliberate northern Muslim conspiracy to blackmail the federal government with a view to extracting undue political advantage at the expense of the largely Christian southern part of the country. They therefore assume and indeed promote the view that, granting amnesty to Boko Haram members is tantamount to succumbing to an ethno-religious and regional agenda.

Besides, the opponents of the call for amnesty particularly those from the Niger Delta region, many of whom by the way regard the country’s oil resources as exclusively theirs, suspect that the issue is part of a grand scheme designed by the Muslim north to eventually get the federal government make a huge financial commitment to compensate the victims and rehabilitate the former combatants, which according to them is an unnecessary waste of “their resources.”

On the other hand also, northerners, who groan under deteriorating security and socio-economic conditions, and who see no real breakthrough in the military operations conducted against the insurgents and equally suffer at the hands of the security agents understandably support the call for amnesty, which they believe would bring an end to this protracted security quagmire. They also argue that, if former President Yar’adua; a northerner, a core northerner for that matter could grant amnesty to Niger Delta militants, which brought their insurgency to an end, nothing justifies Mr. Jonathan’s refusal to grant amnesty to Boko Haram especially considering the fact that he himself is a Niger Deltan hence he should reciprocate what his former boss, former President Yar’adua did to his people.

Anyway notwithstanding the foregoing and though in any crisis of this nature or any internal insurgency for that matter, amnesty is necessarily granted to the insurgents at the appropriate time in order expedite the process of ending the insurgency, make reconciliation and sustain the hard-earned peace and stability; the effectiveness and success of such amnesty depend entirely on the ability of the government concerned to impose certain realities on the ground in the first place, which would do away with, or at least limit, the insurgents’ available chances of surviving anymore and expose them to the inescapability from succumbing to the pressure of renouncing violence and accepting  the amnesty offer.

  

To put this in Nigerian context, I believe that a call for amnesty to Boko Haram insurgents at this particular juncture is too early, because government has so far failed to impose such realities on the ground. The Joint Task Force (JTF) for instance, and by virtue of its composition, which is composed of various security forces and intelligent agents, is supposed to be capable of gathering accurate intelligence on the insurgents to conduct pre-emptive and crushing military actions with the amount of precision required to efficiently counter the guerrilla warfare style adopted by the insurgents and subdue them without having to inflict harm on the innocent civilians, or with the minimum and absolutely inevitable collateral damage.

Unfortunately however, the largely unprofessional way in which they conduct their operations has not only failed to tackle the escalating insurgency but it in many instances actually proves quite counterproductive. It is obvious that the mediocrity that has characterized the operations of the country’s institutions particularly over the past few decades, has taken its toll on the military’s combat readiness and tactical skills also, hence their apparently dwindling inability to tackle armed groups and insurgent in the country. This explains why the insurgents are increasingly growing confident in their ability to exhaust the security forces by drawing them into a potentially very prolonged and exhaustive showdown. After all, sometimes the question of who actually chases the other between Boko Haram and the other armed groups on one hand, and the security forces on the other, is rather difficult to tell.

  

Therefore the question whether Boko Haram should be given amnesty or not, should be viewed in the context of a wider strategy to resolve the crisis permanently. This strategy is of three dimensions, each dimension representing a particular course of action to pursue by the appropriate authorities and institutions simultaneously These institutions are, (1) the military authorities, represented by combat strategists and various intelligence agencies, which are expected to grow equal to the challenges and apply appropriate force professionally to crush the insurgents, (2) Muslim clerical institutions, represented by the office of the Sultan, which are expected to explore avenues to engage the insurgents in intellectual debates with some carefully selected Muslim clerics with a view to convincing them that their peculiar Islamic religious understanding, which inspires them to engage in such violent activities is completely wrong,  and (3) political establishments, represented by the presidency, which are expected to keep encouraging them to renounce violence, which may of course and  in due course include the offer of amnesty and incentives to rehabilitate and integrate those who renounce it.

Instead of trading blames, and if this integrated approach is carefully implemented and followed through diligently, I believe it will not only end this crisis, but it will also prevent the resurface of the phenomenon that caused it.