Politics and the killings in Benesheik

Also published in today's Daily Trust

Notwithstanding whether the continued virtual total blockade of communication network in Borno state has actually undermined the abilities of Boko Haram militants or not, it has, almost completely, cut off many good social commentators from that particular part of the country, especially who were active on the social media.

I therefore host one of such good commentators, Abdulhamid Al-Gazali, a brilliant young man from Maiduguri to share his thoughts about the recent massacre in Benesheik. Enjoy,

“On the 8th of September, the town of Benesheik was attacked by the Boko Haram forces on a shoot at sight campaign, but thanks to gallant Anti-BH volunteers; they killed only (if there is anything ‘only’ about life) about 11 people. However, when they rammed into the town fully armed, the volunteers ran to the nearest JTF post (or BOYONA, which by the way does not matter) to call the attention of the soldiers; but primary sources say, they said they had no fuel.

1. This compelled a helpless people—according to the residents—to cough out money, to give them to fuel their patrol van. 2. Even with that, it took them more than an hour to get there when the operation was already over—a distance of just about 3 – 5 km. 3. And their overloads have irrationally shut down telecommunication with which to draw the attention of other units or Maiduguri for the help of the more active and serious civilian volunteers.

4. Pushed to the wall, with a reluctant, fear-stricken, unready military, and with nowhere else to look for help, the volunteer forces had to rise to the occasion and by Allah’s help, forced the insurgents to retreat—unfortunately at the cost of about 11 lives.

5. As if this meant no big signal, as if it meant nothing big, the soldiers remained as un-alarmed as unprepared and unready for a whole week, seven straight days, in what has been an emergency situation on ground even without such circumstances—they sought for no reinforcement, neither of personnel nor ammunition. 

6. This is despite the speculation mongered in every corner of the town—that must have undoubtedly fallen to the JTF’s ears, which was enough to alert a really committed security—about a possible attack by the Boko Haram. 7. These inherent unpreparedness, apparent reluctance, operational inflexibility, and lousy off-guard-ness (of course of all Nigerian forces), very clearly known to the Boko Haram, they came reinforced and determined, a week later and the result was the loss of 250 lives!

Perhaps, on the course of the operation, the lily-livered soldiers, cowardly fled—the very usual way! What was unusual, this time, is that they did not later on return to resort to doing what they are best at: the posthumous, hardship-multiplier scorched earth policy. And for the record first time, they said the truth: “we had to retreat [to hiding, till after three raw days, i.e. Friday]; leaving behind the unarmed civilians to their fates.

Question one: it is not so much about why they should retreat, but why for reinforcement? Run out of ammunition in an emergency situation? Didn’t they have any alternative communication gadget - since they with no reasons switched off the telecom services, to the disadvantage of all, even, unbeknownst, more to themselves—with which to call the attention of their headquarters? 

They added that, their weapons were quite inferior to those of the insurgents; but one wonders why they never admitted and disclosed this known fact earlier, that and when something could have been done. We are often fed with stories of weapons boasted to have been ‘tracked and recovered [through intelligence…]’ from the Boko Haram—indeed I have watched a video footage to that respect—which included anti-aircraft riffles, rocket launchers etc., [which naturally cancels any excuse of being unaware of its kind of weaponry]; why didn’t they, if at all they are prepared and willing to win this war, also acquire similar, or even superior ones—which their budgetary allocation can very much conveniently stand?

If—pardon my ignorance in advance—they said it can’t afford, and we pretend to believe; couldn’t they, at least for emergency purposes, use those they said it seized from them against them? That is if it is permitted by the law.

The whole thing, going by the enormity of the destruction caused, is disturbing because it happened despite the establishment of a new army division which many saw as a finishing blow that will completely pipe the insurgents to the finishing line. It however only puts to open the slackness with which the security handles the matter. We received with sigh of relief the news that the insurgents were dislodged in their strongholds. 

What should follow naturally—as ignorant as I am in that field—is to make concerted effort at taking over, and with the reinforcement of 8,000 personnel, also consolidating the might of the state over the whole area with the determination that the enemy never regains it.

I particularly receive the establishment of the new division with happiness. Borno shares borders with three countries. I know, as a historian, quite well that the entire corridor of Lake Chad, up to the Mediterranean coast has been a theatre of war from time immemorial—and which is one very fundamental factor in the Boko Haram crisis.”